Over the last decade, there has been growing
In this paper, we rorus on measures or change In belld �bat satisfy a special proper�y tha� we call modulorit11. 
History and derlvatloD of a modular update
The first modular update was proposed In 1878 by Pelrce2• Tbls quantity, which be called "weight of evidence," Is equal to the logarithm or a rr.tlo or conditional probabilities commonly called the likelihood ratio.
Several other researchers
Independently disC'overed this simple but powerful me�ure of change In belief. Tbey Include Turlng1, Good4 and Minsky and
Seltrldges. To see that thlll quantity Is a modular upd:ll e, first consider Ba�·es· Theorem for evidence E and hypothesis H:
p(HIEe)
Tbr rorrr!pondlng formula Cor tbe negation or the hypothesis.
The quantity
Is called tbe likelihood ratio, and Is written >.(H,E,e). To see that >. 15 an update by definition (1 ), consider Bayes' theorem for two pieces of t'\' ldence:
Thtrdore. by tbe definition or >. we see that
(s)
In particular, >. Is a probabilistic update with the update romblnatlon function.#. being simple multiplication.
If we assume that evidence for a bypothesl5 15 conditionally lndeptndent on the hypothesl5 and Its negation. then
>.(H,E,e): >.(H,f,e). (7)
In otber words, t -he likelihood ratio Is a modular update wben condltl � na.l lndtpendence Is a.ssumed.
Note that with this a.ssuJIJJ) tlon, the combination of tbe update loc(>.l takes on the simple form
Petree referred to these modular updates as •weights of nldenrr• because they are added just as wel�ts on a scale. Peirce argued that logfXI 15 a usetul probab1115tlc quantity Cor acquiring and making Inferences with uncertainty.
Historical confusion about absolute beller and beller updates
The· usr of wtll·characterlzed updates In reasoning systems ba.s bern rart. Only a few systems have accurately manipulated wtll-undtrst.oo d measures or change In belief (e.g., the GL.-\SGOW DYSPEPSIA system, using the measure
ln>.((H.E)J1).
One explanation for the Infrequent and often Inappropriat -e use or measures or chance In belief Is that di!!<'U!!Ion or tht quant.lt.lts Is rtlatlvely obscure; treatises on probability theory often focus solely oa the use or absolute mt�urts of belief In lnfer�ntlal reasoning. Another reason may bt related to p�t coaru�lon about the relatloosblp of belief updates and a.b301ute belief In the literature.
Confusion surrounding the relationship of measures of ab!Oiute belld and belief updates surfaced In discussions In the mld·twentleth crntury as res�archers began to rediscover tbe subjtctlv� Interpretation of probabilities.
'Whereas Bayes proposed probability as a personal measure of belief over two hundred years aco. the tarly twentieth century was marked by the rlst of tbe Interpretation of probabilities as frequencies. Alt-hough tbe frtqutncy Interpretation of probability Is still quite popular, the early lg30's saw a "rediscovery" or probability as a measure of personal bellef7. Among others. Ramsey. Savage. Carnap, and DIFenettt led tbl5 redl5covery. Wt believe that confusion in the mid-twentieth century about ttrms such as confirmation and corroboration and poor understandlnc or their relevance to measures or chance In belief might lnd�ed br rontrlbuting factors to more recent confusion surrounding 1 he us� or modular belief updates versus absolute bellt'f in marhine intelligence research.
Carnap originally
lntroduc�d tbe phrase. degree of ronfirmation In his classic work. Logical Foundation� of Pro6a6ilit118• primarily to dlstln,ulsh · the subjective lnterprttatlon
Modular updates ln MYCIN

MYCJN. EMYCJN, and Its descendants have reasoned with measur�s of changes In belief called certainty factors (CF's). MYCIN's knowledge Is represented as rulu in tbe rorm or IF E THEN H
where H Is a hypothesis and E is evidence bavlng relt\'ance to the hypotl)esls. A certainty !actor' Is associated with tach MYCIN rule. CF's were deslcned as measures or thangc In belief about a hypothesis clven some evidence12. The quantities ranee between ·l and l; positive numbers correspood to an incrcue In belief In a hypothesis wblle negative quantities correspond to a decrca.c In belief wben certain evidence becomes available.
Often In MYCI�. srveral pieces of evidence are reiHant to the samt hypotheses. Thus. tbe creators of tbe CF model denloptd methods for tom6ining certainty factors.
In tbe original work. they presented a function for calculating an errecti\'e certainty Cact. or for two pieces or f\'ldence In terms or ctrtalnty factors for each piece of evidence separately. That is. they as!umed the basic update property, (1 ). Furthermore. tht'y Implicitly assumed that the CF quantity satisfied tbe modularity property (:!). by writing certaloty factors as a Cunrtlon of only H and E. Now let us ronslder the original definition of certainty factors:
This dfflnltlon clearly demonstrates that certainty factors are lnttnded to reprucnt chan,es In belief. However, there arc problems with the dtflnltlon. First. we shall show that malclll& the assumpc ion or eondlc.loDal IDdtpeDdeDce or evlde11ce given H and -H Is Inconsistent wltb the modularity axiom. We find tbls lnronslstency to be UDrea.so11able as u. Is Impossible to capture complex lnuractloDs among evlde11ce ror hypotheses wheD modularity Is assumed. Second, we shall show that, In certain sltuatloDs, the modularity axiom Implies marginal independence which Is unacceptable as It makes updatllll Impossible.
Consider the natural extensloD of the certainty factor deOnllloD to Include prior evidence:
l'nder the a.ssumpt1o11 or co11dltlonal Independence or evidence glnD H and -H. It can be shown by counterexample that the abovt CF dtriDilloo does not satisfy the modularity property, Indeed, ass uming condltloul Independence leads to a violation or the modularity axiom.
We now coDSider the ddlnltloD of certainty factors 111 a limiting c�e.
In rac:t, this situation was discussed In the original work In a sec:t1o11 c:oncernlng the elicitation or certal11ty factors rrom cxperts12:
We 110ttd earlier that experts arc often wlllln& to state de&rees or belld In terms or tODdltlonal probabilities (p(HIE>l .••. IL Is perhaps reveal111g to note, therrfore. tbat wheD tbe a priori belief Is small (I.e., p(H) Is clast to z:ero). the CF of � hypothesis eonflrmtd by evidence Is approximately equal to Its conditional probabUU.y on that evidence:
Tbls observation suggests tbat coDrlrmatlon, to the extent that It Is adequately represented by CF's, Is close \o conditional probability (In certain cases).
altbough It still defies analysis as a. probability measure.
The authors are saying tbat the posterior probability or H given E Is approximately equal to the certainty factor ror H and E (a modular update) when p(H} Is small. Note that. If tbls argumtnt Is applied to tbe definition of certainty factors extended to IDcludc prior evidence, we get CF(H,E,e) .,_ p(H[Ee) when p(HJe) .,_ 0.
Howtver, (!!) with E = e then Implies that
That Is, evldenre and hypotheses arc marginally Independent. Using tbe limiting value or the CF dertnillon as an approximation for a modular belief update Implies that evidence can have no Impact on belief 111 hypotheses.
Given such a result. It Is surprising tbat tbe ori&IDal definition or certainty factors was not questioned.
Unrort.unat.cly, In the case or MYCIN, tbls problem Jed to the elicitation or absolute quantities 111 \leu or updatest'. We note here that It Is possible to fl11d updates which are runcllo11s or the prior and posterior probabilities, In the spirit or (8) . wblcb are modular. These qua11tltles are closely related to the likelihood ratio >.
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Modular updates in INTERNIST·l
INTERNIST·! was the result of a major research project to build an expert system for Internal medicine diagnosis. The sysum uses 111 ad hoc: methodology for reasoning UDder uncertainty.
The method ror mana&ID& UDcertaiDtY In INTERNIST·! Is associated with similar problems with modularity.
In fact, INTERNIST-I. like MYCIN, uses quantities ellc:lted as absolute measures of belief In a methodolog,v that lmpllrltly ass umes they are modular updates.
The creators or INTERNIST·l elicited measures or belief from experts called et•oHng •trength•. Evoking strellgths can take on Integer \'alues between 0 and 5. An IDformal dertnitioD Is assorlated with tarh or these \'alucs. For example, an evoking strength or 1 means that the "diagnosis (or the disease In questloDIIs a rare or unusual cause or the listed manifestation." AD evoking strc-ngtb or 3 meaDs that the "diagnosis Is the most common but not the overwhelmln& cause or listed manifestation." And an evoking stren,th of S means that the "llSttd m3nlrestation is pathognomonic ror tlmpiJeatesJ tjle dlsea,c." E•;oklng strengths are elirited In quite the same way as 011e would elicit the posterior probability p(HIE). The measure is vltwtd as an an!wer to tbe questloD •Given a patient with this rlndln,. how strongly should I consider this diagnosis to be its explan3tlon7"16 In fact. e\·oklng strengths are described as brln& "somewhat analogous to a posterior probability. "18 In INTERl':IST-1. evoking strengths are u�ed 111 determining tht •srorts• ror dlseast hypotheses. A disease's score. in turD. rough!)' reflec-ts the belief that it Is present in a patie11t: a high score Is assoc:lated with a likely disease hypothe.:sls. The score ror a disease Is computed In part by summing evoking strength,.
This strongly suggests that these quaDtltl!s are Intended to be updates a.s defllltd by the basic update property (1 ). Furthermore, evoking strengths are o11ly a fUDctlon or the two arguments H and E. Tberdore. INTERNIST·l researchers also Implicitly assumed that evoking stre11gths satisfy the modularitY property (2) .
However, as 111 MYCIN. the assumptloD that p(HIEe) is a modular update leads to the unacC'eptable rc:�ult that evidence aDd hypotheses are marginally Independent.
Summaey and c:onc:lusions
We ban formally defined the property of modularity With rrsptct to measures or change In belief, which we call modular update..
As we bave discussed, modular updates were Introduced In tbe nineteenth century !Jut have remained obscure In comparison with tbe more familiar use or absolute measures or belief ID rea.so11lng under unc:ertalnty. We have argued t-bat two plausible reasoning systems have used IDapproprlatc: measures or belief ill systems that assume tbe modularity property. It Is Important that measures or belief or belief update are combined In a way eonslstellt with their rllcltaUon from experc.s lest srrlous flaws In reuontn& may result.
We rind confusion about modular updates In two Influential systems to be troublln&. We believe that future syst. ems would brndlt from explicit consideration of the properties and requirements a.5soclated wltb tbe use or modular belief updates In plausible rea.sonlnc.
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